It holds 20 trillion won in cash and needs 600 trillion won.

• Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix are known to have about 100 trillion won and 20 trillion won in cash, but the amount of investment being discussed recently is hundreds of trillion won.
• SK Hynix plans to pour 600 trillion won into the Yongin cluster.
• Some analysts say that SK Hynix’s operating profit is 100 trillion won (approx. However, risk is a risk. The semiconductor industry has a long cycle. Prospects for bubble generation are already mixed, and investment should be made in five years’ time.

SK’s customized preferential treatment? Resolving reverse discrimination?

• If the government eases regulations on holding companies and lifts regulations on separation of financial and industrial sectors, SK Hynix can secure a 50 percent stake with SPC as its subsidiary and raise the remaining 50 percent from outside. Samsung Electronics does not seem to have much interest in the separation of financial and industrial sectors, but SK Hynix is in desperate need.
• SK Chairman Chey Tae-won has no share in SK Hynix, but he will gain absolute control over SK Hynix and its subsidiaries. This is the magic of his 51 percent stake.
• SK Hynix claims that “it is not a preference, but a solution to reverse discrimination.” It is argued that it is unfair that SPC investment cannot be made because it is a holding company.

Something that can’t be done because it’s a holding company.

• Chun Jun-beom (vice-chairman of the Corporate Governance Forum) sees the issue of separation of financial and industrial sectors as a matter of conflict of interest.
• The principle of the holding company system is to separate control and business as much as you own it. However, if you go under the subsidiary, the leverage becomes too great. So, the great-grandchild company should hold a 100% stake. Without these regulations, the control multiplier will be much higher than the circular investment in the past.
• The deregulation that has been discussed recently aims to break down these principles. With just 51 percent of ownership, the company can control the board of directors and exercise 100 percent of control. Cheon emphasized, “We have to decide who will check and supervise the controlling shareholder’s control, and who will take responsibility in case of loss or failure.”

Still, if stock prices go up, everyone will be happy.

• Of course, the AI revolution is not a bubble, but a new normal’s growth engine, and SK Hynix’s corporate value may skyrocket. Naturally, it can be a good opportunity for fund investors.
• However, it is a story when it goes well, and the question of who judges it in the first place remains. In a holding company structure, 20% of controlling shareholders can make management decisions against the interests of 80% of minority shareholders. This leverage is greater when it goes down to grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
• The gap between ownership and responsibility, I think it will work out roughly, so can we break down the principles.

From shareholder-agent issue to controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict of interest.

• Chun Jun-beom stressed, “We should look at it from the perspective of ‘pursuing private interests or the company’s overall interests’ rather than ‘manager, shareholder’ or ‘short-term or long-term’.
• “‘How to control managers’ was a concern 100 years ago, and a ‘board-centeredness’ of experts was created to monitor it. We haven’t gotten this far yet.”
• “Our problem is that even if the company makes good money, it can’t be distributed to the other 70%. This is the Korea discount. 70% of people are buying and selling in the KOSPI market, and the remaining 30% of controlling shareholders trade among themselves. The price traded in the 30% market is higher. In other words, the KOSPI market is undervalued.”

(The full text is in the comments.)