In the case of “Lime Martini Fund,” it would be difficult to make it a seller’s problem

In the case of “Lime Martini Fund,” it would be difficult to make it a seller’s problem

1. Let’s say that most of them invested in stocks and managed some non-marketable assets in an open fund that made them able to find their money at any time.

Usually, if non-marketable assets are 10-20% within the fund, especially mezzanine or RCPS, they can be disposed of in a secondary market or other way, so they can’t be considered to have been forced to repurchase assets that can’t be repurchased. Assuming the worst-case scenario that can’t be disposed of, you just have to return all stock assets that can be sold at any time on the market. (However, we should inform all beneficiaries of the private equity fund in the same way and make them repurchase together, right?)

2. In addition, the part that someone pointed out in the article, “The management company voluntarily sacrificed for the fund investor,” is also ambiguous. Although controversial, there is no such law as .

However, assuming that it was difficult to dispose of, there would have been no controversy at all if only non-market assets were excluded and only stocks were sold for partial redemption. Hmm. It’s necessary to check how the management company put its own money

Anyway, it seems that it is a political judgment to question the management of the management company as a sale or repurchase process by the securities company. If Mirae Asset PB makes 100 concessions and calls and buys it back, the PB who manages the beneficiary’s assets can call from a risk management perspective, and the beneficiary must have trusted and responded to the repurchase. Then the seller asks the management company to repurchase the fund and it’s over. The seller has no way of knowing what the management company is doing and converting it into cash, and it can’t be!!!

Crucially, in September 2019, it was early in the Lime crisis, so the seller was like, “I’m a little nervous?” and some were like, “Should I take out the funds?” and I don’t remember that I was not worried that Lime Management would stop the full repurchase at that time…

As far as I remember, the Lime scandal was reported by Hankyung in July, and two months went by when I was worried about it (a seller like us is busy calling the management company to find out about the situation). And the decisive trigger was the non-extension of the PBS department of a securities company that helped leverage TRS at the time. This led to the suspension of redemption from October, with other securities companies joining

In any case, the prospect of a fund repurchase has been foreseen by a leading beneficiary, who has pressured the management to invest their own money into the open fund in question? Writing fiction, I guess.

PS) Our company recommended the buyback of Lime bond funds to the beneficiaries and sold them all in the middle. Phew. I feel dizzy thinking about it now

PS2) However, there is still a long way to go because the corporate department sold the Optimus Fund and Retail sold the Discovery Fund ㅜ.ㅜ

~ ○ Financial Supervisory Service “Redemption with Company Money”I’m sure it’s a favor”

According to the financial investment industry on the 27th, “Lime Martini Specialized Investment Private Equity Trust No. 4,” which lawmaker Kim joined through Mirae Asset Securities’ PB, was an open long-short fund that mainly invests in domestic stocks. It is a fund that mainly uses a strategy of buying (long position) stocks that are expected to rise and short selling (short position) stocks that are expected to fall.

80-90% of the fund’s assets consisted of general domestic listed stocks. It is true that investors were able to buy back at any time because it was an open fund and mainly held stocks traded in the market. In other words, the situation was different from Lime Pluto or Tetis Fund, which were not easy to buy back due to the high proportion of non-current assets such as CB and private equity bonds. All 16 Lime Martini 4 subscribers made a repurchase at Mirae Asset’s recommendation in early September 2019. Around the same time, Lime Martini 2 was also reportedly repurchased.

The problem is that Lime Martini funds also had 10-20% of non-current assets. One was CB of listed companies and the other was RCPS of unlisted companies. What the Financial Supervisory Service is problematic about is that Lime Management took on these non-marketable insolvent assets. Lime Management put a total of 450 million won in its own funds into Lime Martini 2 and 4 by directly joining these funds. In other words, the fund spent the company’s money to make up for the investments that could not be recovered immediately. Lime Management reportedly executed 210 million won for Lime Martini 2 and 240 million won for 4.

“In fact, Lime Management paid for and took charge of bad assets,” a securities industry official said. “It is difficult to see it as a reasonable judgment that the management company voluntarily sacrificed it for fund investors.” It is known that some of Lime Martini’s non-market investment assets have not been recovered until now, more than four years later. Lime Management declared a complete suspension of its fund’s repurchase in October 2019, a month after it repurchased Lime Martini 4.