Is the ‘Russian Engine Mistake’ story true?

Why South Korea Becomes World’s 7th Space Power “For One Small Mistake” Made by Russia

The story that Korea “reconstructed and analyzed by receiving a real liquid rocket engine thinking it was a model” in Russia is talked about on the Internet and some videos, but it is close to a narrative that is not confirmed by the government, research institutes, or official data. The white paper on defense and science, which deals with the development process of KSLV ‑I and KSLV ‑ II, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), ADD data, and domestic and international space technology analysis reports do not mention such accidental technology transfer cases. Experts say that the background of Korea becoming the world’s seventh independent country for space launch is not Russia’s “Mistake No. 1” but the result of phased cooperation and independent development accumulated over 20 years.

Realistic cooperation with Russia: Naro’s first-stage engine, but it didn’t give design
In the early 2000s, Korea collaborated with Russia’s Khrunichev and Energoma City to develop the KSLV ‑ I, which uses a Russian-made liquid engine for the first stage and a domestic solid motor for the second stage. In the process, he learned a lot of “system-level” technologies such as launching sites, assembly, fuel injection, and test facilities, know-how in launching operations, and safety and quality control procedures, but he did not receive the core first-stage engine design drawings, material prescriptions, and combustor designs until the end due to the ban on technology transfer. Rather, it remains in the official record that Russia’s frequent delivery delays and technology controls have increased the pressure for Korea to one day build its own liquid engine.

The Nuri-ho 75-ton engine is not a “replication” but a pure domestic design
The 75-ton liquid engine of the KSLV ‑ II is a separate engine that has been designed independently from the combustor structure, turbo pump, gas generator, and cooling method, as well as the combination of propellant (Kerosene + LOX) and thrust class (about 75 tons). The Korea Aerospace Research Institute has repeatedly solved combustion instability, expansion nozzle cracks, and turbo pump vibration in hundreds of combustion tests throughout the 2010s, and the process is close to a typical “self-reliance development curve.” If the Russian-made real engine had been disassembled and replicated as it was, there would have been no reason for such long-term design changes, tests, and failures, and the engine shape would have been much more similar. In the comparison of photographs and drawings released so far, the Naro, Nuri, and Russian engines have distinctly different structures and pipe arrangements.

[The real reason why Korea became the world’s 7th largest space power]
There are three reasons why South Korea is classified as “the seventh country in its territory to launch a practical satellite with its own projectile.”

After experiencing the entire space launch system through Russian cooperation, the company switched to a 100% domestic design Nuri,
Most of the engines, tanks, structures, thrust control, and ground propulsion system facilities were supplied by domestic companies and research institutes,
It is repeatedly building credibility by launching military, civilian, and scientific satellites on its own.

This trend was compounded by factors such as long-term budget investment for the independence of space technology, policy consistency that did not change its direction even after the Naro failure, and expansion to private satellite and exploration projects.

Why did this ‘Russian mistake’ narrative spread
The story that the real engine was sent to Korean hands by mistake as a “Dummy” has a structure similar to that of the Cold War era’s takeover of technology in the communist region. With limited public data, Russia’s opaque technological control, and Korea’s rapid leap, it was a good environment for imagination that “there is a secret somewhere.” However, such episodes do not appear in interviews with researchers who participated in the development of Naro and Nuri, records of government audits, and publications of science and technology donations and anti-coincidence. Although popular, the narrative that attributes science and technology achievements to “accidental gifts” is highly likely to distort the actual science and policy context.

The real drama of becoming a space powerhouse is not “mistake”, but “obsession”
Korea’s ability to launch space in the world’s seventh-largest was not due to Russia’s small mistake, but to pursue a long-term strategy to “build our engine in the end” despite unfavorable conditions such as missile guidance and technology control. This is not an accomplishment that was accelerated by accidentally obtaining confidential information from a specific country, but rather a result of technological sovereignty accumulated after hundreds of failures, tests, budget investment, and manpower training. Looking back on the history of space development, Korea’s real drama is not a “secret engine of others” but the process of creating technology that no one gives it for free.